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[25 C.2d

Oct. 1944]

It is deemed inappropriate to decide in this proceeding
the question of law thus presented to the commissioner. The
solution of it one way or the other would not determine this
application. [1] The question here is whether the defendants have made out a case for the issuance of the writ. The
showing made discloses an attempt in good faith to prevent
execution on the judgment. pending the appeal by the filing
of the required bond and that the sureties on the bond presented for that purpose have sufficiently justified.
The writ of supersedeas should therefore issue as prayed
upon the approval of an undertaking in the sum of $2,050
by the judge who tried the case or by the Presiding Judge
of the Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County within
forty days from and after the filing of this order. The bond
heretofore filed and on which the sureties have been examined
and justified may constitute such bond upon agreement of the
sureties and approval by the court.
It is so ordered.
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[2a,2b] Id.-Suspension-Evidence-Fraudulent Conduct Towards
Client.-The evidence supported a finding of the Board of
Governors that an attorney, retained by a league of claimants
of an insolvent association on a contingent fee basis, had.
intended to deceive said claimants into believing that certain
Supreme Court decisions in representative suits, instituted by.
other claimants, were due to his own written efforts or· active
participation in said litigation, where, in addition to his. statement that the "Supreme Court has finally sustained our position," representations had previously been made, on soUcitatioD of members, that the purpose of thelea,,"1le was "to press
their claims in a similar suit," and where he did nothing
other than to follow the course of pending litigation.
[3] ld.-Suspension-Failure to Advise Clients as to Double Liability for Fees.-An attorney for a league of claimants of an
insolvent association who was either initially aware. of the
prayer for and award of counsel fees to attorneys of record
in representative actions instituted by other claimants, or was
specifically advised of such fees by a letter written by the
Corporation Commissioner, should have advised the league
members, who were subject to liability for. such fees, ~hat they.
would have to pay the fees in the representative actions in addition to his fee, and his failure so to advise said members
constituted cause for disciplinary action against him.
[4] ld. - Suspension - Evidence - Misconduct With Respect to
Fees.-The evidence supported a finding of the Board of Governors that an attorney for a league of claimants of an insolvent association attempted to compel the payment of legal fees
by two claimants who had not signed subscription agreements
or otherwise become obligated either to the league or to him,
where it appeared that when one of the claimants and a friend
called on the attorney they merely told him that they would
let him know later, and that they thereafer agreed that he
did not have as much to offer as anoth~r group of claimants.

Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

[So F. No. 17016. In Bank. Oct. 20, 1944.J

WILLIAM H. PENAAT, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR
OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1] Attorneys-Suspension-Evidence_Presenting False Application.-In a disciplinary proceeding, the evidence Supported
a finding of the Board of Governors that the attorney prepared and filed with the Division of Corporations a verified
application for a certificate to solicit contingent fee contracts
containing material allegations which he knew to be false,
where, assuming there was actually a league of claimants, or
an executive committee of said league, for which the attorney
was .retained as counsel, the committee members mentioned
in the application as having consulted with and been advised
by his law firm had never met him personally or consulted
with him or his firm.

PROCEEDING to review a recommendation· of suspension
of an attorney for six months. Petitioner suspended for six .
months.
LeoR.. Friedman for Petitioner.
JeroldE. Weil for Respondent.
THE COURT.-Petitioner seeks a review and the dismissal
of a disciplinary proceeding wherein it has been recommended

McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4] Attorneys, § 172(9); [3] Attorneys, § 140.

[2] See 9 Cal.Jur. Ten-year SuPp. 407; 5 Am.Jur. 422.
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that he be suspended from the practice of the law in this
state for a period of six months.
The charges are based upon petitioner's alleged solicitation
and purported representation under contingent fee contracts
of a group or league of claimants of an insolvent building and
loan association. The Board of Governors concluded. as
ground for suspension, first, that petitioner solicited one
claimant in violation of rule 2 of the Rules of Professional
conduct, and second, that petitioner violated his' oath and
dutiesa~ an attorney and committed acts involving moral
turpitude in: (a) attempting to collect from two claimants
legal fees which petitioner knew were not owing to him or to
the league for which he was acting as attorney; ,(b) sending
the claimants letters by which petitioner intended to deceive
in certain particulars; (c) failing to advise three claimants
from whom petitioner collected fees that in addition to such
compensation they were liable for fees awarded by the court
to attorneys of record in representative actions; and (d) preparing and filing with the State Corporation Division a veri~
fied application for a certificate to solicit contingent fee contracts containing material allegations which petitioner knew
to be untrue and misleading.
In 1933 there had been filed on behalf of a group of share
claimants of an insolvent building and loan association, certain actions designed to establish their right to share, with
holders of investment certificates, in liquidating dividends.
Trial of the causes in 1935 resulted in a judgment for plaintiffs, from which an appeal was taken. (See Martin v. Oalifornia Mut. B. & L. Assn., 18 Cal.2d 478 [116 P.2d.71].) As
these Martin actions were not representative, in the year 1937
another g:::,oup of claimants retained L. H. Schellbach , et al.,
as counsel, to institute representative suits in behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, for the purpose of
establishing their right to share in liquidating dividends. (See
Adams v. Oalifornia Mut. B. & L. Assn., and Byl v. Oalifornia
Mut. B. & L. Assn., 18 Cal.2d 487 [116 P.2d. 75].) About this
same time one Charles E. Betts told petitioner that he owned
a passbook representing a deposit in the association; that a
friend, Flynn, was also the owner of a passbook, and that
Flynn's sister, Jean Dixon, was a depositor. He proposed the
formation of a committee which would be represented by petitioner for the purpose of establishing claims against the asso-

Oct. 1944]
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ciation. About June 1, 1937, he purportedly joined. with
Flynn and Dixon in the organization of the Building and
Loan Investors' League, and in .the formation of a so-called
executive committee' of that league.'
.'
_
Petitioner was informed by Flynn and Betts that he was
retained as counsel for the league and he accepted that eni~ .
ployment. He never met Jean Dixon. Upon information
supplied by Flynn and· Betts he prepared the documents he
deemed necessary to express the purposes of the league and a
. subscription agreement whereby those joining would agree
to pay a sum equal to 5 per cent of their shares in the association to cover expenses of the league, and an additional 15 per
cent as counsel fees in the event of recovery. The organizers
were to have their own claims handled free of charge and were'
to receive 2% per cent of the initial 5 per cent payments, peti,
tioner to retain the other 2% per cent.'
The league, if it actually existed, was never a bona fide or~
ganization of holders of membership shares in the 1lssociation.
Betts had no interest in any membership share. Flynn was a
security broker who acquired certificates only by transfer.
His sister, Jean Dixon, worked in his office and the shares
standing in her name were assigned to her in April, 1936, and
assigned by her to one Lee not later than October 29, 1931..
The so-called managing body or executive committee of the
league was said to consist of Dixon, Mrs. White and, Miss Mary ,
S. L. Wilson, of "c/o Anna Head School, 2538 Channing
Avenue, Berkeley." The Miss Wilson at that address never
had anything to do with the association or parties here involved. Another Miss Wilson of Berkeley, had been solicited,
by letter, had called at petitioner's office with a friend, and
had left without joining the league. Mrs. White was. a depositor in the association, but she never. heard of the league or
executive committee until about the time of distribution of
dividends when she received a letter from the commissioner
advising her that petitioner claimed a fee. Flynn testified .
that Mrs. White's husband had authorized the use of her
name.
. So far as shown no meeting of the league or of the executive
committee was ever held, no officers were elected, and no pro~
ceedings were taken other than the things done by Betts and
petitioner. The Board of Governors found that the league was
not a bona fide organization of holders of membership shares

;
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but that petitioner "did not know that said league and said
committee were not bona fide."
After the purported organization of the league, Betts continued his work of solicitation, sending out letters from petitioner's San Francisco address, although he also maintained
his own office in San Jose. [1] In ,January, 1938, pursuant
to the enactment in 1937 of the Security Owners' Protection
Law (Stats. 1937, p. 2232, Deering's Gen. Laws, p. 1787,
Act 3815), petitioner prepared and filed with the Division of
Corporations, an application signed and verified by Dixon for
a certificate of authorization for contingent fee contracts solicited and to be solicited. This application recited that the
executive committee of the league was composed of Dixon,
White and Miss Wilson of the Head School, all of whom held
approved claims against the association; that Dixon and
vYhite had consulted petitioner's law firm; that the firm had
recommended to them that they institute an action to protect
their rights; that since such a proceeding would be rather
expensive they determined to affiliate other claimants similarly situated; that with this in mind they formed the league,
sought and received the cooperation of other claimants, and
retained petitioner's firm as counsel on a contingent fee of
20 pel' cent of the ultimate recovery. The commissioner refused to issue a certificate on the ground that he was unable
to find that the proposed plan was not "unfair, unjust, or inequitable,'" and would not "work a fraud" upon purchasers.
The recitals of the application, the Board of Governors found,
were "material and were false and were known to [petitioner]
to be false," in many material respects. This finding, under
the evidence, is correct. Assuming that there actually was a
league, or an executive committee, or that petitioner actually
believed in their existence, it 'was a fact, which he knew, that
neither Dixon nor 'Vhite had ever met him personally or consulted with him or his law firm. For an attorney to properly
give advice to clients relative to the formation of a league,
and the committee of a league, and its affiliation of other members, the attorney should know who his clients are, and not
misrepresent to the Corporation Commissioner that he has
consulted with the clients and advised them in certain particulars, when he knows the statement is not true.
A few months after formation of the league, in September
and November of 1937, the two representative suits, Adams
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and Byl, supra, were filed, and in each a request was made
for an allowance of counsel fees for attorneys of record for
the named plaintiffs therein and others of similar status who'
would benefit in the event of successful prosecution of the litigation. Petitioner admittedly knew at all times of the pendency of these suits, but claims that he did not know of the
prayer for and granting of counsel fees until after the final
decision on appeal, and hence did not know that some memo
bel's of the league would be liable for such fees. He testified
that a .,Copy of the complaint which he borrowed from attorney Schellbach did not contain a prayer for fees, and that he
never examined the record in the courthouse. He said that he
had prepared a complaint on behalf of league members, but
had never filed it as he decided instead to watch the progress
of the pending suits,
'
In describing the serviceR rendered for league members.
other than those already mentioned, petitioner testified that
he investigated court proceedings, had six or eight telephone
conversatiom~ and one or two personal interviews with the
original attorney for the commissioner; talked with a man in
the office of counsel handling the Martin caReR: saw Mr. Schell·
bach twice and talked with a man in his office: talked with
the attorney who represented the commissioner in the lat.er
stage of proceedings: did quite a bit of legal research; exam·
ined the Martin files ana glanced through t.he Adams and By!
fileR in Mr. Schellbach's office. The board found that pet.itioner "did not file any suit on behalf of the members of !laid
league, but did inve!ltig.ate and 'kept himself informed concerning the progress of the litigation that would be dete1'lllinative
of the rig-htFi of the memberFi of said league." Petitioner as~erts that a "mere reading of the findings is apt to lead to
the concluFiion that rhe 1 nerformedno !'!ervices Tor memherg
of the league, but a reading of rhis1 testimony completely
refute!l such a conclusion ", The record shoWR. however. t.hat
the finding~ give petitioner the benefit I)f every. inference 1)1"
implication to which he is entitled with respect to the rendi·
'tion of !lervices. Other than taking steps to put in motion the
procedure by which he might obtain contingent fee cont.racts
and gain thp "dvantage of "lolicitation work done hy Betts.
petitioner. ~n far as shown. oio nothing other than to follow
the course of pending litigation, and upon its successful tel'IIli·
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nation undertook to collect such fees as it was possible for
him to secure.
Within a few months after creation of the league, the board
found, Betts abandoned his activities in connection with it.
. He did not see petitioner after 1939. and his whereabouts
at the time of the hearings herein were unknown. He had
delivered to petitioner aU agreements signed at hiR solicitation. and aU initial paym~ntR had been divided equally between the two. fIe had also supplied a list of six or eight
purported members of the league, other than Flynn. Dixon
and White, but had not supplied contracts for some of them;
in particular there were no contracts with W"hite, Wilson or
Day.
[2a] In August, 1941. this court rendered decisions favorable to theplaintiffl'l in the Martin. Adams and Byl cases.
supra. Petitioner thereupon consulted with the Commissioner
relative to requirements for presenting hiR claim for fees.
On October 6. 1941. he sent the attornev for the commissioner
a list of the members' he claimed to represent, and about two
week.", later he mailed his alleged clients a letter reading in
part:
"For several years we have been handling the matter of
. your claim . . . and we are glad to report that the California
Supreme Oourt has finaIJy RURtained Our pORition . . . . No effort has been made heretofore to approve the claimR of such
claimants aR vourRelf <In "lome form of proof of clHim will no
douht he set up . '. and some meanR of identification. no
douht. required beforp thp dividend distribution will be made
. . . WE' will ('omml1nieatE' with you again
and will do all
we can to get your dividend to you at the earlieRt pOSRihlE'
date. . . " Thp hoard found. contrary t.o thp finding of thp
Local Committee. that pet.itionerinte'nded by this letter t.o
deceive the claimants to whom he addresRed it. hy "cauRing
said claimant.s to helievp that the deeision on Il,ppeal in the
AdamR and By-I proceedings waR due to the efforts of rnetitionerJ and, t.hat rPE'titioner ) had actively participated or
rendererl '!ervices in ~aid litigation."
A reading of the letter, coupled with a consideration of
the repreRentations which had been made upon the solicitation
of memherq and thereaft.er. iR snffirient to '!how that the finding is Rupnorted A letter of '1nlil'itl1tion "'ent out hy RpttR
had told claimants that the purpose of the league was to as~
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sociate the members together "to press their claims in a similar suit"; that "our attorneys are already at work upon th~
matter." The agreements signed referred among other things
to "bringing, maintaining, settling, and compromising such
proceedings, and legal actions as may be deemed necessary or
advisable to protect my intereRts." and provided for retention by the attorney of "twenty percent of any recovery obtained by or for me," and that "any costs allowed by the
court and collected win be refunded to the subscribel'E!pro
rata." In September. 1938, petitioner ha.d written:. "We
have been following certain litigation which'is pending in th~
Appellate Oourt. have prepared a suit onbehal:f of the depositors we represent. including yourself. and ultimately upon
the termination of the litigation on appeal we.feel confident
that a recovery will be had in your behalf.•• /' In the light
of these previous assurances and representations the stat~
.ment.in the letter of October 6th. that "For several years. we
have been handling the matter of your claim .•• and we are,
glad to report that the California Supreme Court had, finally
RURtained our position .' ." could only mean 'that the SUCCesRluI termination of the litigation waFl due in Rome part to the
efforts or active participation of petitioner.
[8] On December 9. 1941. the attorney for the commiR~
sioner advised petitioner by letter that "some of the share:
holders, by virtue of the fact that their rights were eRtabliAhed
through a representative suit. are burdened with,the payment
of a prorata '1hare of the attornev!l' feeR. in the amount
13%% of their ~laimFl
.. " and 'Tor further inTonnation
the letter referred petitioner to MeRRl'E!. ~chel1bach. etal.
The following day petitioner adviRed the commil'l~ioner that
he repreRented eig-ht named clientR whose claims aggregated
$9.318.03. and on December 20th hE'a~ainwrote thecommiR~
sioner ~aying . 'WE' have a contingent percentage interest iii
each of the claim", ., in the lil'lt that we recently l'Ient to you.
and would RuggeRt
. making the check payable to the I'IhareholderR and the attorney. thul'l necel'lRitating the endorsement
of the check by hoth."
On March 6. 1942. in an effort to get further authorizations,
petitioner wrote hiR alleged clientFl ",tating: "The litigation
in this matter hal'l finally ended and the . . . CommiR..sioner 11'1
about to apply to the {'·ourt for directionFl as to distributing
the lundR . . . His attorney has asked us to procure a letter
llS C.lld-ll

.,
~;
,
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from the people whom we are representing which can be deposited in court showing our authorization to make the necessary appearance!' in your behalf. I am enclosing a letter
which I would appreciate your having signed. . . . "
Of the list of eight alleged clientR submitted by petitioner,
four had never signed !'mbRcript.ion agreements. and only one
had indicated any willingness to cooperate or join the league.
Two others on the list. Robt. and Anna Scholz. proteRted to
the commissioner that although they had <;hmed. it wa!' by
misunderstanding as to their "real rcprm;cntative. ,. for they
had previously fligned up with the Schellhach group. 1'hese
two, and two others, were liable for counRel feeR in the representative suits. 1'he hoard found that petitioner knew. or in
the proper performance of hi!' dutieR aR counsel for the league
should have known. of the award bv the court of ('onnRel feeR
to attorneys of record in the repre~entative actiom;. and that
petitioner· did not at any time advise the member~ of the
league who were '4uhject to such liability that the,\' would
have to pay fee1' awarded in the representative action1' in
addition to petitioner'~ fee.
Petitioner argue~ that these findings are unsupported because he repeatedly tef'tified to hi~ lack of knowledge or recol.
lection of knowledge of fecR in the repref'entative ~uitR until
after the deci~ion on appeal when he wa~ advi~ed by t.he at.
torney for the commi~~ioner. But even if petitioner waR not
initially aware of the prayer for and award 0f feef< in t.he
repre~entativp snitR hec:lll~p of hi~ failure to examine nocu,
ments of recorn. he wa~ "pecificalJ? advi~eil of them b:v the
commi,"sioner'~ letter of no('emher 9th, Vet he ilid not mention the matter to hi!" ('Iient". even while "ali citing' further
authorization:;: from them, 1'0 tho~e who faileil to repl? t.o
hi~ above mentionNl lpttf'l' 0f March nth. he <lent n follow np
about March 1 ~th. ~a?ing among' other thing'R: "
. 1'hi~ caRe
will probably hp heard in the very near fnture amI T wouk!
appreciate it if von won](1 'lend the authnrizntion hack to me
at the earlieRt pOR~ihle moment." As a rel'l1llt 0f nrntel'ltf' hy
some of the A.llege<i ('lientR. the commi!'l!'lloner wrote netitioner
that unlesf> matter~ were ad.in~ted at once he would he for('ecl
to interplead all partie>: with whom 'Iettloment hail not heen
made 0f the eight a.lleg-ed elientR. three <:ecured A waiver of
petitiOllPr'~ ('laim, ()TIe compromiRed. nne naid 11ndpr proteRt.
and the other three submitted to his demands. In all he
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received an estimated $100 from his 2% per cent of the initial
5 per cent payments, and between· $300 and $400 from the'
remaining 15 per cent collections.
But petitioner contend~ that even if he had known of the
award of fees in the repreRentative suits, it was not incumbent
upon him to advise members of the league as to their liability
to pay fees in a suit to which they never'voluntarily became
parties. The obviou~ answer i~ that petitioner's clientR. ",ere
looking to him to proteet their intereRt~. and not to be required
to pay double fees of 131,~ Del' cent to one set of attorneys and
20 per cent to another. 1'hi~ eourt in the AdamR ease said
(18 Cal.2d 487. 489) : "InaRmuch as theRe are representative
actions, brought on behalf of named plaintiff~ and otherR similarly Rituated but not represented in correRpondinP.' litigation.
any award of counsel fee~ Rhould be paid out of that portion
of the fund recoveredbv thoRe for whose benefit these action~
were brought." Petitio~er. RO far a~ shown. made no effort
to either associate himself a~ cOlm~el of record in the representative suitR or to institute "corresponding litigation ,. on
behalf of hiR clients. but claimed the right t.o hi" 20 pel' cent
contingent fef> merely for "following" the Rucce~sful course of
thf> suitf' prosecuted hy others, thUR impreRsing Rome of his
clientR with double liahility. [2b] In good faith he Rhonld
have advised them of the facts. ~o they could have decidfln
whether they wIRhpd hi" additional renrflsentation. and should
not have misled them by the indefinite tenor of hi" cor·
respondence on the Rllh.iect of whether he actual1y instituted
1itig-ation in th eir hehalf
[4] 'rhe hoard found that it was not true that petitioner
-:olicited employment t.hroug-h Bett~ hut that it was true t.hat
he ~oliciten legnl emplovment hv Marv E. Wilson. and that
ander a claim which he 'knew to 'hf> un~arranted he sought to
compel the payment of leg-al fee" hY Mary E. Wil~on.and
C:ynthia Day. who had not <;ig-neil <;ubsl'ription ag-reementR 01'
otherwise become obligated eithpr to t.he leag-ue or to him,
Petitioner contend~ that t.heRP adverse findings cannot bp
reconeileo with findings in hi~ favor to thf> flffect that he rlid
not know that thf> league and committee were not bona fide:
that he did not ~olicit through Bett~: that "among the holners of mem bership "harc!' solieited by BeUR by letter was
Mary Estelle Wilson .•• "; and that it was after the solici-
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tation by Betts that Miss Wilson had her first contact and
conversation with petitioner.
But the evidence shows that when Miss Wilson and a friend
called on petitioner in response to the Betts letter, they
"merely told him after listening we would let him know later,
and when we got outside we both agreed we did not think
he had to offer what the other group in San Jose had to offer,
and that ended the matter." Notwithstanding this, petitioner
claims he believed that as a result of the interview Miss Wilson had retained him. When asked: "Referring to the two
depositors. White and Wilson, weren't you interested in determining in some more exact fashion than just the statement
from Mr. Betts what clients you represented in this matterY",
petitioner replied, "Well, 1 thought it was a bit odd there
weren't contracts from them but 1 assumed in the confusion
and handling of these various papers' he had misplaced them
or lost them, and there would be no reason for me to have the
names on the list unless he had at one time contracts from
them." Although petitioner never saw Betts after 1939, he
continued until the spring of 1942, to assert his claims for
fees against Miss Wilson and the other alleged clients.
The record shows ample support for the findings and conclusions of the board, and no good reason has been advanced
for refusing to follow its recommendation.
It is ordered that petitioner be and he is hereby suspended
from the practice of the law for six months, this order to
become effective thirty days from the filing of this decision.
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[So F. No. 16889. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1944.]

WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant,
v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[So F. No. 16890. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1944.]

WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant,
v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[1] Judgments-Collateral Attack-Motions to Vacate Judgments.
-A motion to vacate a judgment, made after the expiration
of the six-month period allowed in Code Civ. Proc., § 473, is
governed by the rules applicable to collateral attack.
[2] ld.-Collateral Attack-Limiting Consideration to Matter Apparent on Record.-In the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake, a judgment which is collaterally attacked cannot be set
aside unless it is void on its face.
[3] ld.-Collateral Attack-Presumptions.-Every presumption is
in favor of the validity of a judgment, and any condition of
facts consistent with its validity will be presumed to have
existed, rather than one which will defeat it.
[4] ld.-Collateral Attack-Erroneous Judgment.-A mere erroneous decision on a question of law, even though the error
appears on the face of the record, does not make the judgment
void, if the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the person of the defendant.
[5] Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Delay Exceeding Five Years.-Since a statute cannot cut off a right of action without allowing a reasonable time after its effective date
for the exercise of the right, Code ClV. Proe., § 583, which became effective in its present form in 1933, and which makes the
filing of the action the starting point of the five-year period,
[4] See 15 Cal.Jur. 83; 31 Am.Jur. 181.
[5] Construction and application of statutory requirement that
action should be brought to trial within specified time, note, 112
A.L.R. 1158. See, also, 9 Ca1.Jur. 542.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 282(3); [2] Judgments,
§290; [3] Judgments, §296; [4] Judgments, §330; [5] Dismissal,
§ 64; [6] Judgments, § 335; [7] Attorneys, § 55; [8] Attorneys,
§ 62; [9] Attorneys, § 46; [10, 12] Taxation, § 290; [11] Judgments, § 330(2); [13] Judgments, § 331; [14] Costs, § 2.

